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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the case of Annette Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A.,1 the 
Eleventh Circuit recently determined that a person who suffers emotional 
injury due to a violation of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) may obtain damages for her injury. Until 2001, 
the law was fairly settled that emotional damages were available for such 
violations. But in Barnes v. Gorman2 the Supreme Court departed from 
precedent and applied contract law to determine whether punitive 
damages are available for violations of acts passed pursuant to the 
Spending Clause.3 The Court in Barnes held that punitive damages were 
not available as emotional damages and are not generally available when 
a party breaches a contract.4 A handful of district courts, including the 
Southern District of Florida,5 subsequently held that emotional damages 
were not available as compensatory damages for violations of the 
Rehabilitation Act6 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.7 
This was the first time a circuit court faced this question post-
Barnes and given the precedential authority this decision is likely to 
have, the stakes were enormous. If the Eleventh Circuit had affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, denying emotional damages suffered as a result 
of a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, victims would have been left 
without the ability to seek any redress other than injunctive relief. The 
right to relief can be traced as far back as Marbury v. Madison, where 
Chief Justice Marshall declared that the “very essence of civil liberty . . . 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
                                                                                                             
 1 Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 2007 WL 3087215, at *18 (11th Cir. 
Oct. 24, 2007). 
 2 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 4 536 U.S. at 181 (2002). 
 5 Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network P.A., No. 05-61240-Civ-Cohn (S.D. Fla. June 
9, 2006) (on file with author). 
 6 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000). 
 7 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). 
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laws, whenever he receives an injury.”8 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
will resonate far beyond victims of Rehabilitation Act violations to 
victims of violations of any federal act passed pursuant to the Spending 
Clause.9 
According to 1990 congressional findings, approximately forty-
three million Americans had at least “one or more physical or mental 
disabilities.”10 Almost one-half of the total disabled population—24.1 
million Americans—was classified as having severe disabilities.11 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to provide 
expansive protection against discrimination for individuals with physical 
and mental disabilities in the United States.12 For many of these people, 
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are the only legal guarantees that 
they will not face discrimination.13 Thus, if the Eleventh Circuit had 
                                                                                                             
 8 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 10 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990). 
Congress noted this number was increasing as the population grew older. Id. Statistics 
from the Department of Commerce suggest that by 1992 the number of disabled 
Americans increased to forty-nine million. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, at 137 (114th ed. 1994). 
 11 LEWIS E. KRAUS, SUSAN STODDARD, & DAVID GILMARTIN, CHARTBOOK ON 
DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, AN INFOUSE REPORT, National Institute on Disability 
and Rehabilitation Research (Dep’t of Educ. 1996). 
 12 Ronda Cress, J. Neil Grindstaff, & S. Elizabeth Malloy, Mental Health Courts and 
Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental 
Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006) 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(c); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b)). 
 13 Other federal civil rights laws protect the rights of disabled persons in highly 
specific circumstances. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, A 
Guide to Disability Rights Laws (Sept. 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/cguide.htm. 
Federal laws ensure that people with disabilities are not discriminated against: access to 
telecommunications, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)(2), 255 (2000) (requiring manufacturers of 
telecommunications equipment and providers of services to ensure that such equipment 
and services are accessible to persons with disabilities); fair housing, see Fair Hous. Act 
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000) (prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, and national origin); air carriers, see 
Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in air 
transportation by domestic and foreign air carriers against qualified individuals with 
physical or mental impairments); voting places, see Voting Accessibility for the Elderly 
and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (2000) (requiring polling places across the 
United States to be physically accessible to people with disabilities for federal elections), 
and Nat’l Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2000) (requiring all offices of 
state-funded programs that are primarily engaged in providing services to persons with 
disabilities to provide all program applicants with voter registration forms, to assist them 
in completing the forms, and to transmit completed forms to the appropriate state 
official); public education, see The Individuals with Disabilities Educ. Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1400 (2000) (requiring public schools to make available to all eligible children with 
disabilities a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment 
appropriate to their individual needs); building or facilities designed or altered with 
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affirmed the lower court decision and limited the ability of the disabled 
to enforce their rights under these laws, millions of Americans would 
have suffered a severe, detrimental impact to their quality of life. 
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT AND AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 (“the Act”) to 
enforce “the policy of the United States that all programs, projects, and 
activities receiving assistance . . . be carried out in a manner consistent 
with the principles of . . . inclusion, integration, and full participation of 
the individuals [with disabilities].”14 To achieve this goal, Congress 
enacted section 504 of the Act to prevent “discrimination, exclusion or 
denial of benefits to otherwise qualified handicapped individuals by any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”15 It provided, 
in pertinent part, that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”16 
To ensure that it protected a wide variety of persons, the Act 
focused on characteristics likely to lead to discrimination.17 An 
“individual with a disability” was any person “who (i) has a physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person’s major life activities; (ii) has a record of such impairment; or (iii) 
is regarded as having such an impairment.”18 Congress also provided 
wronged individuals a private right of action against wrongdoers, 
“granting [them] the possibility of damages, injunctive relief, and 
                                                                                                             
federal funds, see The Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (2000) (requiring that 
buildings and facilities that are designed, constructed, or altered with federal funds, or 
leased by a federal agency, comply with federal standards for physical accessibility); 
mistreatment in state and local institutions of confinement, see The Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000) (authorizing the U.S. Attorney 
General to investigate conditions of confinement at state and local government 
institutions such as prisons and jails). 
 14 29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (2000). 
 15 S. Rep. No. 93-318, at § 504 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 
2143. 
 16 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
 17 According to Sande L. Buhai & Theodore P. Seto, Tax and Disability: Ability to 
Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1065 (2006), this approach 
marked a new paradigm for disability that broadened the 1935 Social Security Act, which 
limited its protections to objects of pity and philanthropy. 
 18 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000), Buhai & Seto, Tax and Disability, supra note 17, 
at 1065. 
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attorney’s fees, without any requirement that the plaintiff first exhaust 
administrative remedies.”19 
Section 504 of the Act prohibits recipients of federal funding from 
discriminating against disabled persons and requires that programs or 
activities operated by a federally-funded entity be readily accessible to 
persons with disabilities:20 “[m]oreover, Section 504 prohibits provision 
of different or separate assistance to, or retaliation against, people who 
assert Section 504 rights.”21 The regulations do not require public 
accommodation facilities to alter inventory to include accessible goods 
or special goods designed for use by individuals with disabilities.22 Nor 
do the regulations require recipients to make every part of a facility or 
even all existing facilities accessible to people with disabilities.23 Section 
504’s regulations generally require that disabled individuals have equal 
opportunities to achieve the same benefits as non-disabled persons. 
Although the Act was enacted to protect against discrimination of 
disabled individuals solely on the basis of their disability, the Act’s scope 
was limited to cover state and local governments that receive federal 
funding.24 But many state and local programs, including many state court 
systems, do not receive federal assistance. Thus, more expansive 
antidiscrimination legislation was needed to protect more fully the rights 
of disabled individuals.25 
By the early 1990s, Congressional findings indicated that the 
Rehabilitation Act was insufficient to protect disabled people from 
discrimination. The Congressional findings of fact in section 12101 of 
the ADA indicate Congress’ realization that society has a tendency “to 
                                                                                                             
 19 Buhai & Seto, Tax and Disability, supra note 17, at 1065. 
 20 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.520, 42.521(a) (2006); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, 
Life, Death, and Choice, HARV. J. L. & GENDER 425, 430 (2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(2004)). 
 21 Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a 
Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1127 (2000) (citing 
28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b) (1999)). 
 22 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.303(a)-(b), 36.307(a). 
 23 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150(a), 42.521(a); see also Armen H. Merjian, Bad Decisions 
Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline, and Improper Application of the Undue Financial 
Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act,  
65 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 119 (1999). 
 24 Ronda Cress, J. Neil Grindstaff, & S. Elizabeth Malloy, Mental Health Courts and 
Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental 
Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006) 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000); 29  U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (2000). See also U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (holding that the scope 
of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is limited to those who actually “receive” federal 
financial assistance). 
 25 Cress et al., supra note 24, at 310. 
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isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities” and that such 
discrimination “continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social 
problem.”26 According to these findings, society’s actions have relegated 
individuals with disabilities to “a position of political powerlessness . . . 
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the 
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, 
society . . . .27 The findings further indicated that “the continuing 
existence of . . . discrimination and prejudice denies people with 
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis . . . .”28 
Congress enacted the ADA in 199029 “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities . . . .”30 It intended for the ADA to 
“be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose.”31 Congress sought to 
achieve this by furnishing “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities . 
. . .”32 
The goal of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”33 The ADA decrees: “No individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person 
who . . . operates a place of public accommodation.”34 The ADA also 
extends far beyond private sector employment discrimination, pursuant 
                                                                                                             
 26 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
 27 See id. § 12101(a)(7). 
 28 See id.§ 12101(a)(9) (concluding that such discrimination “costs the United States 
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and 
nonproductivity”). 
 29 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
 31 Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (D. 
Md. 2001) (internal citation omitted). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Section 202 of the ADA states, in part, that “no individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  Thus, while section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act  prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal 
funding, including private organizations, section 202 of the ADA prohibits discrimination 
against the disabled by public entities. See also Barnes., 536 U.S. at 236. 
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to Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Spending 
Clause.35 
As it had under the Rehabilitation Act, the legislative history of the 
ADA indicates that Congress intended to provide wronged individuals 
with a private right of action against their wrongdoers, and to grant them 
the possibility of damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees, without 
any requirement that the plaintiff first exhaust administrative remedies.36 
Congress also provided that the remedies for violations of section 202 of 
the ADA would be co-extensive with the remedies available for a 
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.37 Thus, as the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision applies to both ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases, it 
has wide-ranging implications. 
                                                                                                             
 35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(b)(4) (2000). Supreme Court decisions enforcing civil rights in the pre-civil rights 
era were often premised on the Spending Clause, rather than on the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia., 328 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1946) (reversing 
conviction for violation of a state segregation statute regarding bus transportation based 
on the Spending Clause). 
 36 Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages for Intentional Discrimination by Public Entities 
Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other Name, but 
Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 235, 254 (1995) (concluding that Title II 
incorporates an “appropriate relief” remedial standard under which attorney’s fees may 
be recovered, but punitive damages may not be). Section 12205 provides for fee-shifting 
under the ADA: “In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this 
Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and 
the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12205. However, “[f]ee shifting under the ADA, like other civil rights statutes, 
is asymmetric: Fees should be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, but 
prevailing defendants should recover only when forced to litigate claims that are 
frivolous, unreasonable, or pursued in bad faith.” Sanglap v. Lasalle Bank, F.S.B., 345 
F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Greenier v. Pace, Local No. 1188, 245 F. Supp. 2d 
247, 249 (D. Me. 2003) (holding defendant only permitted attorney’s fees under the ADA 
where plaintiff’s suit was “totally unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable”). 
 37 See Barnes, 536 U.S at 181. Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act declares 
that the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title [sic] VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 shall be available” for violations of section 504. Id. at 185. Similarly, § 203 of 
the ADA declares that violations of § 202 shall have the same “remedies, procedures, and 
rights set forth in § 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act.”  Id. Thus, the remedies for 
violations of all three provisions – § 202 of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
and Title VI – are co-extensive. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF SHEELY V. MRI RADIOLOGY NETWORK, P.A. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
On June 8, 2005, Annette Sheely went to University MRI to obtain 
an MRI for her sixteen-year-old son.38 Ms. Sheely is blind and was 
accompanied by her son and her seeing-eye dog.39 When her son’s name 
was called, Ms. Sheely rose to go with him, but was told that her seeing-
eye dog was not permitted outside of the waiting room.40 When Ms. 
Sheely inquired as to why she was not permitted to bring her seeing-eye 
dog into the examination, the University staff responded with a list of 
reasons.41 She was initially told that the restriction would protect her 
dog’s safety and increase Ms. Sheely’s comfort.42 The staff then 
explained that the restriction would also promote the dog’s comfort.43 
Finally, the staff told Ms. Sheely that the metal on the dog’s harness 
would interfere with the procedure.44 Her son was then led back for the 
MRI without Ms. Sheely present.45 
Ms. Sheely’s legal action averred that this incident inflicted 
emotional distress on her, claiming it created fear and tension about 
going to new places.46 Furthermore, Ms. Sheely asserted that the incident 
and resulting anxiety disrupted her ability to sleep.47 Accordingly, Ms. 
Sheely sued University MRI for violations of the ADA and section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act.48 In particular, she claimed that University 
MRI failed to provide a viable reason for denying a person with a seeing-
eye dog access to areas in which others similarly-situated with a service 
animal would have had access.49 After an initial discovery period, 
University MRI moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that 
Ms. Sheely did not have standing to sue for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, and that emotional damages were not recoverable under section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.50 
                                                                                                             
 38 Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network P.A., No. 05-61240-Civ-Cohn (S.D. Fla. June 
9, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sheely Order]. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 2. 
 45 Id. at 6. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 3. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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B. The District Court’s Ruling 
The district court ruled that Ms. Sheely had standing to sue for 
injunctive relief but that emotional distress damages were not available 
to a plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act.51 The court’s analysis began 
by noting that the Supreme Court’s holding in Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Public Schools allowed “all appropriate relief.”52 However, the 
court found that the “scope” of “appropriate relief” was subsequently 
clarified in Barnes, where punitive damages could not be allowed in a 
private suit under the Rehabilitation Act.53 The court recognized that 
under Barnes, a Rehabilitation Act suit “is actually a contract-like action 
against an entity that fails to provide the contractual service” and that 
“only compensatory damages for failing to provide the contractual 
obligation are recoverable.”54 The court also relied on Witbeck v. Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical Univ., Inc.55 which followed Barnes and denied 
claims for mental anguish, damage to reputation, embarrassment and 
humiliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The Sheely court stated that the 
“Witbeck Court’s analysis of the competing pre-Barnes district court 
decisions on this issue of whether emotional distress damages are 
available under the Rehabilitation Act remains accurate.”56 The court 
relied on Witbeck despite acknowledging that Witbeck erroneously 
interpreted Franklin: “[T]he Witbeck decision mistakenly concludes that 
the ‘Barnes court found that its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public School did not apply to Rehabilitation Act causes of action.’”57 
C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Ruling 
At first blush, the district court’s opinion appears to be correct. 
Emotional damages are rarely available in breach of contract cases.58 
Consequently, if the contract analogy promulgated in Barnes applies, the 
decision seems appropriate.  However, when analyzed more closely, the 
opinion rests on a series of legal propositions that appear fallacious when 
closely analyzed. First, the district court interpreted Barnes as applicable 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. at 13. 
 52 Id. at 12 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 at 68 (1992)). 
 53 Id. at 12 (citing Barnes, 536 U.S at 186-87, 189). 
 54 Id. 
 55 269 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 56 Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 13. 
 57 Id. at 13 (citing Witbeck, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 n.1). 
 58 JOHN E. MURRAY, 1-9 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 123 (4th ed. 2001). (“Courts 
have been particularly reluctant to allow damages for emotional distress in contract 
actions.”). See Picogna v. Bd of Educ. of Cherry Hill, 143 N.J. 391, 396-97 (N.J. 1996) 
(“[T]he potential for fabricated claims justifies a requirement of enhanced proof to 
support an award of such damages.”). 
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to compensatory damages as well as punitive damages. Further, the 
district court concluded that emotional damages are never available for 
breach of contract claims. Because both of these propositions 
misconstrue or misstate the law, the district court’s decision stood on 
questionable legal ground. 
On October 24, 2007, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district 
court and held that Sheely could obtain damages for emotional harm that 
she suffered.59 The court explained that Barnes utilized contract law as 
an analogy to address a concern that federal funding recipients must have 
fair notice of any liability they might be subjected to by federal courts.60 
The court noted that fair notice was not a concern here; federal funding 
recipients are on notice that they might pay emotional distress damages 
because emotional distress is a predictable and thus foreseeable 
consequence of discrimination.61 The court also held that even if contract 
law were directly applicable, emotional distress damages would be 
available because federal funding recipients agree not to discriminate and 
cause emotional harm when they accept funds. 62  Finally, the court 
indicated that emotional damages are a compensatory damage designed 
to make “good the wrong done.”63 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION AND THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL 
A. The District Court Incorrectly Relied Upon and Interpreted Barnes as 
Applicable to Compensatory Damages as well as Punitive Damages 
The district court held that emotional damages are barred by 
Barnes’s rule that “only compensatory damages for failing to provide the 
contractual obligation are recoverable.”64 As explained more fully below, 
Barnes addressed only the narrow question of whether punitive damages 
are recoverable under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and did not 
consider whether emotional damages are available. In reaching its 
conclusion, the district court did not address the body of law–precedent 
that Barnes did not disturb–holding that emotional damages may be 
recoverable.  Nor did the district court fully address Franklin v. Gwinnett 
                                                                                                             
 59 Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 2007 WL 3087215, at *18 (11th Cir. 
Oct. 24, 2007). 
 60 Id. at *18. 
 61 Id. at *19. 
 62 Id. at *20-21. 
 63 Id. at *21. 
 64 See Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 1. 
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County Public School, the case upon which Barnes based its holding,65 
which ruled that a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages.66 The 
district court’s failure to address Franklin and contrary holdings raised a 
number of red flags because damages for emotional distress are more 
appropriately considered compensatory damages. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that emotional damages are 
compensatory damages and they are available to plaintiffs who suffer 
emotional distress for intentional violations of the Rehabilitation Act or 
the ADA.67 The court of appeals based its decision on the Bell v. Hood 
presumption, which the Barnes Court reaffirmed, that “federal courts 
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”68 The 
court was not persuaded by the district court’s opinion. Instead, the 
Eleventh Circuit saw “a striking difference” between punitive damages, 
which were not compensatory, and emotional damages which “are 
plainly a form of compensatory damages designed to “make good the 
wrong done.”69 Moreover, the court held that awarding emotional 
damages is particularly appropriate where emotional distress is the only 
alleged damage and thus the only available remedy to “make good the 
wrong done.”70 
1. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School and Its Progeny 
Support a Plaintiff’s Right to Recover Emotional Damages 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is in accord with the law that 
preceded it. Prior to Franklin, most but not all courts held that money 
damages were not recoverable under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972.71 The Franklin Court rejected that notion, 
                                                                                                             
 65 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, at *22. 
 68 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)). 
 69 Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, *21. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Eastman v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 939 F.2d 204, 209 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (concluding that § 504 permits neither compensatory damages for pain and 
suffering nor punitive damages); Rivera Flores v. P.R. Tel. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 71 (D. 
P.R.1991) (limiting recovery to equitable remedies, thus, employee could not seek 
compensatory damages for mental anguish resulting from discrimination), vacated and 
remanded by Rivera-Flores v. P.R. Tel. Co., 64 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 1995); Jenkins v. 
Skinner, 771 F. Supp. 133, 136 (E.D.Va.1991) (relying on Eastman and denying recovery 
for mental anguish); Ams. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. SkyWest Airlines, 762 
F. Supp. 320, 325 (D. Utah 1991) (holding damages for emotional distress unavailable); 
Rhodes v. Charter Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 1383, 1385-86 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (damages for 
emotional distress unavailable); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 649 F. Supp. 35, 37 
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (denying compensatory damages, including for mental suffering or 
humiliation, and limiting damages to reinstatement, back pay and attorneys’ fees); Martin 
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unanimously holding that a plaintiff may recover damages.72 In reaching 
this result, the Franklin Court reaffirmed the longstanding rule, stated in 
Bell v. Hood that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal 
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal 
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”73 
Thus “if a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and Congress is 
silent on the question of remedies, a federal court may order any 
appropriate relief.”74 The Court explained that a plaintiff’s entitlement to 
any appropriate relief derives from the plaintiff’s power to enforce his 
rights: 
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the 
right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the 
right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the 
procedures or actions normally available to the litigant according 
to the exigencies of the particular case.75 
Thus, the Court held that unless explicitly instructed by Congress to 
do so, courts may not impose any restriction on available remedies: 
“[A]bsent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts 
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of 
action brought pursuant to a federal statute.”76 
Although Franklin is a Title IX case, it also controls both Section 
504 and Title VI cases, because Congress intended that the same 
remedies be available under Title IX, Title VI and the Rehabilitation 
Act.77 Similarly, because Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
                                                                                                             
v. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children, 599 F. Supp. 284, 284 (E.D. Mo. 1984) 
(holding damages for humiliation and embarrassment not recoverable); Bradford v. Iron 
Co. C-4 Sch. Dist., 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15924, at *25 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 1984) 
(damages for humiliation and embarrassment non-recoverable); cf. Kling v. County of 
L.A., 769 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 474 U.S. 936 (1985) 
(allowing compensatory damages for pain and suffering); Recanzone v. Washoe County 
Sch. Dist., 696 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Nev.1988) (same). 
 72 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 73 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). 
 74 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 69. 
 75 Id. at 68 (citations omitted). 
 76 Id. at 70-71. 
 77 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002); see also Waldrop v. S. Co. Serv. 
Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 157 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that section 504 and Title IX were 
“virtually identical in the scope of their protections, with the principal exception being 
the class protected. Moreover it is well-established that Congress intended the same 
remedies be available under Title IX and Title VI. Thus, Franklin establishes that 
damages are available in Title VI cases as well as Title IX cases. Similarly, given that 
Congress specifically provided that the same remedies be available under section 504 as 
are available under Title VI, Franklin must permit damage awards for discrimination 
under section 504.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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of 199078 incorporates the remedies provisions of the Rehabilitation 
Act79 under Title VI, the remedies available under both statutes must be 
construed in the same manner. 
Thus, a strict application of Franklin permits emotional damages.  
In fact, since Franklin, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that 
emotional distress damages are recoverable as compensatory damages 
under the Act.80 Similarly, many district courts have also found that 
compensatory damages for emotional distress are recoverable.81  
Not every circuit has had an opportunity to rule specifically on 
whether a plaintiff may recover emotional damages. These courts have 
held more generally that a plaintiff has unlimited access to the full 
panoply of damages under section 504. For example, the Fourth, Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits (and arguably the Third Circuit) have ruled that 
                                                                                                             
 78 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2007). 
 79 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2007). 
 80 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(permitting recovery of compensatory damages for emotional suffering under the ADA); 
Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 675 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that such 
damages may be recoverable if they are specific or particularized and intentionally 
inflicted). 
 81 See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Guilliani [sic], 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19922, at *31 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002) (compensatory damages for pain and suffering are available 
under Title II of the ADA, which employs the same remedial scheme as the Act); Dorsey 
v. City of Detroit, 157 F. Supp. 2d 729, 731 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (compensatory damages 
for humiliation, emotional distress, and embarrassment are available under Title II of the 
ADA); Smith v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5051, at *18  (D. 
Me. Apr. 24, 2001)) (holding that plaintiff could seek compensatory damages for non-
pecuniary losses under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as a result of her 
expulsion from a school dance if she could prove evidence of intentional discrimination); 
Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9, 13 (D.D.C. 1996) (“[p]laintiff may recover 
compensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional pain and 
suffering” under the Rehabilitation Act); Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1373 
(D. Neb. 1993) (compensatory damages for the feelings of isolation and segregation 
experienced by the plaintiff were awarded under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Kuntz 
v. City of New Haven, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20085, at *6 (D. Conn. June 18, 1993) 
(compensatory damages for emotional distress recoverable); Doe v. District of Columbia, 
796 F. Supp. 559, 573 (D.D.C. 1992) (court awarded damages for emotional pain 
suffered by the section 504 plaintiff); Tanberg v. Weld Co. Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970, 
972-73 (D. Colo. 1992) (money damages for loss of professional opportunity, mental 
anguish, and pain and suffering available under the Act); see also Hopwood v. Tex., 999 
F. Supp. 872, 906 (W.D. Tex. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 236 F.3d 256 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (“Since Franklin, the strong trend among federal courts is to allow plaintiffs to 
recover for mental injuries under Title VI and similar federal anti-discrimination 
statutes.”); cf. Saladin v. Turner, 936 F. Supp. 1571, 1583 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (awarding 
compensatory damages for emotional distress in an ADA retaliation claim and holding 
that punitive damages may be recoverable if employer behaved with reckless 
indifference). 
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plaintiffs may recover the “full spectrum” of damages.82 These courts 
could potentially find that compensatory damages for emotional harm 
fall within the “full spectrum” of damages. 
Only a handful of district court opinions after Franklin have held 
that emotional damages are not available, but those cases rely largely on 
pre-Franklin cases or fail to consider the Franklin proposition that all 
appropriate remedies are presumptively available. In United States v. 
Forest Dale, Inc.,83 the court relied on a pre-Franklin case to find that 
monetary damages for emotional suffering are not recoverable. The court 
found that Section 504 damages were limited to retrospective equitable 
damages, ignoring the Franklin presumption that compensatory damages 
are available.84 In Pool v. Riverside Health Services, Inc.,85 the plaintiff 
suffered humiliation when the hospital staff did not permit her the use of 
her service dog within the hospital. The court found that the plaintiff’s 
emotional damages could best be remedied by injunctive relief, rather 
than by compensatory damages.86 The court relied primarily on pre-
Franklin cases which indicated compensatory damages did not include 
recovery for money damages based on mental anguish and emotional 
distress.87 Although the court mentioned Franklin, it restricted Franklin’s 
application to only those cases involving intentional violations.88 As a 
result, the court in Pool limited plaintiff’s remedy to injunctive relief.89 
2. Barnes v. Gorman 
In addition to ruling that emotional damages are recoverable, many 
district courts have also ruled that Franklin’s expansive language to 
“order any appropriate relief” permits the recovery of punitive damages 
as well as compensatory damages.90 In Gorman v. Easley,91 the Court of 
                                                                                                             
 82 Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 157 (“suits under section 504 provide to plaintiffs the full 
spectrum of remedies”); Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 831 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that § 504 provides a “full spectrum” of remedies); Rodgers v. Magnet Cove 
Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (citing Franklin’s rule that “courts have the power to award any appropriate 
relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute” and therefore 
holding that plaintiffs may seek monetary damages under section 504). 
 83 818 F. Supp. 954, 970 (N.D. Tex. 1993). 
 84 Id. See also Doe v. Marshall, 882 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting 
that recovery for compensatory and punitive damages for emotional distress is not 
available; also relying on Forest Dale without addressing Franklin). 
 85 No. 94-1430, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12724, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 1995). 
 86 Id. at *15. 
 87 Id. at *8. 
 88 Id. at *14. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See, e.g., Kilroy v. Husson Coll., 959 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D. Me. 1997) (“The Court is 
persuaded that a private cause of action to enforce the provisions of § 504 exists by 
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned a lower court opinion that held 
punitive damages were unavailable. Relying on Franklin, the Eighth 
Circuit held that punitive damages are appropriate relief because they are 
“an integral part of the common law tradition and the judicial arsenal” 
and Congress did nothing to disturb this tradition in enacting or 
amending the relevant statutes.92 
In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth 
Circuit.93 The Court recognized that Franklin upheld “the traditional 
presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal 
right,” but held that the Franklin Court did not describe the scope of 
“appropriate relief.”94 To determine whether punitive damages were 
within the scope of appropriate relief, the Court turned to principles of 
contract law.95 The Court reasoned that contract law was applicable 
because under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the 
power to place conditions on the grant of federal funds, which is 
contractual in nature.96 Because the Spending Clause legislation imposes 
contractual-type obligations on recipients of federal funds, the Court 
reasoned that contract law can also be used to determine which penalties 
may be imposed when a party violates the terms underlying acceptance 
of these funds.97 
Applying contract law, the Court found that punitive damages are 
not within the scope of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act because punitive 
damages are generally not available for breach of contract.98 The Court 
also found that a court should only impose reasonably-implied 
contractual terms; that is, those terms that the parties would have agreed 
                                                                                                             
implication and that punitive damages are recoverable under section 504”); Worthington 
v. City of New Haven, No. 3:94-CV-00609 (EBB) 1999 WL 958627, at *16 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 5, 1999) (“[P]revailing plaintiffs may obtain punitive damages against a private 
party for a violation of the ADA or Section 504 . . . .”); Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp., 868 F. 
Supp. 733, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“[P]unitive damages are appropriate for § 504 violations 
. . . .”); Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829-30 (D. Md. 1998) 
(holding punitive damages are recoverable under section 504); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley 
Area Educ., 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (interpreting “full panoply” to 
encompass punitive damages and holding that, while available, assessment was not 
justified under the facts of the case); Patricia N. v. Lemahieu, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1253 
(D. Haw. 2001) (refusing to create blanket prohibition on punitive damage awards under 
section 504). In allowing punitive damages, these courts overturned previous rulings that 
held that redress was limited only to physical injuries. 
 91 257 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 92 Id. at 745. 
 93 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 
 94 Id. at 185. 
 95 Id. at 187. 
 96 Id. at 185-86. 
 97 Id. at 186. 
 98 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187. 
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to had they adverted to the matters in question.99 The Court’s final 
conclusion was that a party who accepts federal aid would not reasonably 
expect to be subjected to punitive damages, because “a remedy is 
‘appropriate relief’ only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by 
accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”100 
Although Barnes overturned a long line of cases holding that 
punitive damages are available, it is not clear that the Court sought to 
overturn cases where emotional damages were available. Indeed, the 
Court reaffirmed that compensatory damages are available for violations 
of the Act.101 In doing so, the Court set no limits on what compensatory 
damages are available. Instead, the Court cited favorably to the “well 
settled” rule in Franklin that a court can use any available remedy to 
“make good the wrong done.”102 Thus, Barnes is silent as to whether 
compensatory damages should be narrowly construed to exclude 
emotional damages. 
3. Barnes’s Progeny Provides Support for a Plaintiff’s Ability to 
Obtain Emotional Damages as Compensatory Relief 
After Barnes, courts continued to rely on Franklin to hold that 
damages are available to compensate plaintiffs under section 504 of the 
Act.103  In Ryan v. Shawnee Mission U.S.D. 512,104 the district court 
rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss claims for monetary relief and 
compensatory damages for emotional distress. Although the court did 
“not definitively resolv[e] the measure of damages applicable to . . . [the] 
Rehabilitation Act claim,” the court implicitly disavowed the holding in 
Pool that emotional damages could not be recovered.105 The court found 
instead that the Ryan plaintiff could recover for emotional distress 
damages because he had alleged intentional discrimination.106 
In addition, a number of post-Barnes decisions specifically 
addressed the issue and ruled that compensatory damages include 
recovery for emotional distress. In Norton v. Lakeside Family 
                                                                                                             
 99 Id. at 188. 
 100 Id. at 187-88 (citation omitted). 
 101 Id. at 187. 
 102 Id. at 189 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 
(1946)). 
 103 Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 441 F.3d 1287, 1297 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65, 75, and noting that money damages are 
available for Title IX claims); accord Sauls v. Pierce County Sch. Dist., 399 F.3d 1279, 
1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (same). 
 104 416 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1097. 
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Practice,107 the Maine District Court awarded compensatory damages 
under the Rehabilitation Act for “loss of enjoyment of life, loss of self-
esteem, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and other pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary losses.”108 Similarly, in N.T. v. Espanola Public 
Schools,109 the New Mexico District Court held that damages for mental 
anguish or emotional distress caused by discrimination were available 
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because the statutes function 
as a contract for personal well-being that “contemplate[s] damages for 
loss of that well-being in the event of a breach.”110 A district court in 
Georgia came to an identical conclusion in Ortega v. Bibb County School 
District, where the plaintiffs’ disabled child was killed in a school 
playground accident.111 The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
seek compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act, which would 
“necessarily parallel those sought in a wrongful death action.”112 
In contrast, the two post-Barnes decisions holding that emotional 
damages are not redressable under the Act are not well reasoned, and fail 
to consider Franklin’s holding that all appropriate remedies are 
presumptively available.113 In Witbeck, the court relied on two pre-
Franklin cases: Rhodes v. Charter Hospital114 and Shuttleworth v. 
Broward County115 to find that emotional damages are not available 
under the Rehabilitation Act.116 Both cases were no longer good law 
when Witbeck was decided because they held that, contrary to Franklin, 
compensatory damages are limited to back pay.117 Witbeck also 
misinterpreted Barnes (as the Sheely district court acknowledged) when 
it found that Barnes held Franklin did not apply to the Rehabilitation 
Act.118 
                                                                                                             
 107 382 F. Supp. 2d 202, 206 (D. Me. 2005). 
 108 Id. at 206. 
 109 No. Civ 04-0415 MCA/DJS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43667, at *43–44 (D.N.M. 
May 20, 2005). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Ortega v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 431 F. Supp. 2d, 1296 (M.D. Ga. 2006). 
 112 Id. 
 113 See Witbeck v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003); Khan v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. (D.N.M. 2003) available at 
https://www.nmcourt.fed.us/isys/Q:/ORS/Opinions/BROWNING/03cv00118.1.pdf#xml=
http://10.8.216.2:8844/ISYSquery/IRLE86A.tmp/6/hilite. 
 114 730 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D. Miss. 1989). 
 115 649 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 116 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1340. 
 117 Rhodes, 730 F. Supp. at 1386; Shuttleworth, 649 F. Supp. at 37. 
 118 See Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 13. Specifically, the Witbeck court mistakenly 
asserted that “the Barnes Court found that its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public School did not apply to Rehabilitation Act causes of action.” 269 F. Supp. 2d at 
1340, n.1. 
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Similarly, in the unpublished opinion Khan v. Albuquerque Public 
School,119 the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico 
relied only on Witbeck and pre-Franklin law. Khan cited only two pre-
Franklin cases: Americans Disabled for Accessible Public 
Transportation v. SkyWest Airlines120 and Bradford v. Iron County C-4 
School District,121 to support the proposition that courts do not award 
emotional distress damages for Rehabilitation Act violations. The court 
failed to address the post-Franklin decisions holding such damages 
recoverable.122 
In addition to relying improperly on pre-Franklin cases, both 
Witbeck’s and Khan’s contractual analyses were perfunctory. Witbeck 
and Khan recognized that compensatory damages are available under 
Barnes, but reasoned that because damages for emotional or mental 
distress are generally not available for breach of contract, they are also 
not available to Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs. Khan mischaracterized 
contract law principles by arguing that emotional damages are punitive in 
nature and erroneously suggested that contracts for which emotional 
distress damages are recoverable must involve “a life or death issue.”123 
B. The District Court in Sheely Misapplied Barnes’s Contract Law 
Analogy 
The district court based its holding in part on the proposition that 
Barnes directed courts to look to contract law principles to determine 
what remedies are available to victims of intentional discrimination. In 
reversing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly 
interpreted Barnes. The court of appeals determined that the “Barnes 
Court’s central reason for turning to the contract metaphor appears to be 
its concern that federal funding recipients have fair notice of any liability 
to which they are subject by federal courts.”124 The court held there was 
no such concern here. “We think it fairly obvious—and case law support 
this conclusion—that a frequent consequence of discrimination is that the 
victim will suffer emotional harm As a result, emotional distress is a 
                                                                                                             
 119 Khan v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. (D.N.M. 2003). . 
 120 762 F. Supp. 320, (D. Utah 1991). 
 121 Case No. 82-303-c(4), 1984 WL 1443, at *9 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 1984). 
 122 A subsequent published decision also from the District Court of New Mexico, held 
exactly the opposite. See N.T. v. Espanola Pub. Sch., No. CIV 09-0415 MCA/DJS, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43667, at *43–44 (D.N.M. May 20, 2005) (holding that damages for 
mental anguish or emotional distress caused by discrimination were available under the 
Rehabilitation Act because the Act functions as a contract for personal well-being that 
“contemplate[s] damages for loss of that well-being in the event of a breach . . . .”). 
 123 Khan, at *11. 
 124 Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, supra note 59, at *45. 
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foreseeable consequence of funding recipients’ ‘breach’ of their 
‘contract’ with the federal government.”125 
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Barnes only meant to apply 
contract law as a metaphor. In reasoning that Spending Clause legislation 
imposes contractual-type obligations on recipients of federal funds, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that contract law is not conclusive in 
addressing all issues arising in Spending Clause cases: 
Our decision merely applies a principle expressed and applied 
many times before: that the “contractual nature” of Spending 
Clause legislation “has implications for our construction of the 
scope of available remedies.” We do not imply, for example, that 
suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or 
that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise.126 
Moreover, the question in Barnes, whether punitive damages are 
available, raises issues that are entirely distinct from whether 
compensatory damages for emotional or mental distress are available. 
Punitive damages are designed to advance overarching social policy 
goals, while compensatory damages simply “make good” to a plaintiff 
any harms inflicted by a defendant. This difference, ignored by the 
district court, was noted by the Barnes Court, which stated that “punitive 
damages are not compensatory.”127 
Even if the analogy were applicable, Barnes used it to illustrate that 
a party who accepts federal aid would not reasonably expect to be 
subjected to punitive damages.128 But as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, 
federal funding recipients should reasonably expect to pay damages for 
emotional or mental distress because such damages have historically 
been awarded in Section 504 cases and in other civil rights contexts.129 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. 
 126 Barnes, 536 U.S at 188, n.2 (citation omitted); see also, id. at 186 (“[W]e have 
been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation . 
. . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 127 Id. at 189. 
 128 Id. at 187-88  (“[a] remedy is ‘appropriate relief’ only if the funding recipient is on 
notice that by accepting federal funding it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”) 
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 129 See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (in 
context of § 1983 claim, “compensges awarded in § 1983 context); Wright v. Sheppard, 
919 F.2d 665, 669 (11th Cir. 1990) (same in § 1982 context); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 
F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1985) (damages for emotional distress were recoverable under both 
§ 1981 and § 1983); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 629 F.2d 993, 1005 
(5th Cir. 1980) (emotional damages awarded in § atory damages may include not only 
out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of 
reputation . . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’”); Johnson v. 
Hale, 940 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1991) (emotional dama1981 context); Garner v. Giarrusso, 
571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (same). 
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1.  Emotional Damages Are Available for Breach of Contract 
Claims 
The district court reasoned that if contract law determines the scope 
of available remedies, then Sheely would not have the right to recover 
damages for emotional injury because emotional damages are not 
available for breach of contract.130 However, the court also permitted 
Sheely to obtain injunctive relief.131 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s presumption that 
emotional damages are never attainable when a party breaches a contract, 
holding instead that emotional damages are available when the nature of 
the contract is such that emotional distress is foreseeable.132 The 
Eleventh Circuit explained that the exception allowing emotional 
damages is a “notable and longstanding” one, thereby drawing a clear 
distinction between the compensatory damages for emotional injuries 
that Sheely sought and the punitive damages the Supreme Court refused 
to award in Barnes.133 Thus, the court held that even if contract law were 
applicable, emotional damages would be available, because “where one 
of the benefits the government has bargained for is the funding 
recipient’s promise not to discriminate, the recipient cannot claim to lack 
fair notice that it may be liable for emotional damages when it 
intentionally breaches that promise.”134 
We believe that the district court’s holding contradicts principles of 
contract law that emphasize how appropriate relief should be available 
when contracts are breached. As E. Allan Farnsworth explains: “Our 
system of contract remedies is not directed at compulsion of promisors to 
prevent breach; it is aimed, instead at relief to promisees to redress 
breach.”135 These principles are firm that the injunctive relief, that the 
district court ordered is not appropriate. Injunctive relief, or specific 
performance, is a disfavored remedy except in rare circumstances, such 
as the sale of land, that are not applicable here.136 Damages, which “place 
                                                                                                             
 130 Sheely Order, supra note 38, at 12-13. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Sheely, 2007 WL 3087215, supra note 59, at *20. 
 133 Id.  
 134 Id. at 22. 
 135 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.1 (3d ed. 2004). 
 136 See RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th ed. 1992) (“The 
primary if not the only remedy for injuries caused by the nonperformance of most 
contracts is an action for a damages for the breach, and except in those rare instances 
where only equitable relief is available, as in the case of an oral contract of the sale of an 
interest in land that is enforceable only through a decree of specific performance, a 
judgment for damages will be given for any breach of any contract.”); JOHN E. MURRAY, 
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §117 (4th ed. 2001) (specific performance is “generally 
considered an exceptional remedy”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 135, §12.4 at 162 (“The 
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the injured promisee in the position she would have occupied had the 
promise been performed . . . or … restore her [to] the position she was in 
before the promise was made,” are preferred.137 The Barnes Court 
appeared to endorse this view: “When a federal-funds recipient violates 
conditions of Spending Clause legislation, the wrong done is the failure 
to provide what the contractual obligation requires; and that wrong is 
‘made good’ when the recipient compensates the Federal Government or 
a third-party beneficiary (as in this case) for the loss caused by that 
failure.”138 
Significantly, all of the sources the Barnes Court cited in support of 
its contract analysis139 state that emotional damages are available in 
certain breach of contract cases where the damages are not incidental to 
the breach, but rather where their prevention is the point of the 
contract.140 
Although the district court is correct that damages for emotional or 
mental distress are generally not available for breach of contract,141 
emotional damages are available when their prevention is the express 
object of the contract, when benefits other than pecuniary benefits are 
contracted for, or when they would reasonably or foreseeably result from 
the breach.142 
                                                                                                             
common law courts did not generally grant specific relief for breach of contract.”). The 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS in section 353 adopts the general rule prohibiting 
recovery of non-economic damages in contract cases unless the breach also caused bodily 
disturbance or the contract of the breach “is of such a kind that serious emotional 
disturbance was particularly likely to result.” 
 137 MURRAY, supra note 136, at  § 117. 
 138 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189. 
 139 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64.7 (1922); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 353 (1981); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17 (2001). 
 140 See, e.g., WILLISTON § 64.7 (“Numerous cases allowing the recovery of emotional 
distress damages for breach of contract exist, invariably dealing with what might be 
called peculiarly sensitive subject matter, or noncommercial undertakings or both.”). 
 141 Some courts hold that contract actions for mental anguish are not available. See, 
e.g., Keltner v. Washington County, 800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990). 
 142 See Huskey v. Nat’l Broad Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (denying 
motion to dismiss contract claim alleging emotional damages because breach of a 
contract to engage only in consensual filming of prisoners would reasonably be expected 
to cause emotional disturbance); Occean v. Marriott Corp., 631 N.E.2d 80 (Mass App. Ct. 
1994) (holding emotional harm from breach of an agreement that settled an employment 
discrimination claim “was certainly foreseeable”); Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 931 
P.2d 436, 448 (Colo. 1997) (allowing recovery of emotional damages for breach of 
express covenant of good faith and fair dealing because such damages a “natural and 
proximate consequence” of willful breach); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (“Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless . 
. . the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely 
result.”); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64.7 (1922) (“It has also been stated that where 
other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for, damages have been allowed for injury to 
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Courts in many states have found that mental distress damages are 
recoverable where a contract was of a non-pecuniary nature made “to 
secure [the] protection of personal interests.”143 Rather than defining 
narrow categorical exceptions, these courts have attempted to “formulate 
a broader doctrine, allowing recovery for mental distress resulting from 
breach of contract in a wide range of non-tortious breach situations.”144 
The contracts at stake have a personal rather than pecuniary purpose, and 
that purpose “is utterly frustrated until mental damages are awarded for 
the breach.”145 
Finally, the district court implicitly recognized that Sheely’s 
injuries are cognizable, and that by passing the Rehabilitation Act, 
Congress sought to protect disabled people from suffering emotional or 
mental distress due to discrimination based on their disability.  If this 
harm was incidental, these injuries would not be cognizable and the 
plaintiffs would not have standing to sue.146 
                                                                                                             
a person’s feelings”); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17 (2001) (“Some courts have 
looked to the nature of the contract and made exceptions where breach was particularly 
likely to result in serious emotional disturbance. Other courts have looked to the nature of 
the breach and allowed damages for emotional disturbance on the ground that the breach 
of contract was reprehensible. . . .”). 
 143 See Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611, 620 (N.C. 1979) (mental damages 
recoverable if the contract did not involve trade and commerce, benefits contracted for 
non-pecuniary and benefits related “directly to matters of dignity, moral concern or 
solicitude”); Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824-25 (Mich. 1957) (mental damages 
recoverable for breach of contract for a Caesarean operation when child died because 
contract involved “matters of mental concern and solicitude”); Lamm v. Shingelton, 55 
S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C. 1949) (compensatory damages recoverable for breach of failure to 
deliver a watertight casket and to lock the casket because contractual duty “so coupled 
with matters of mental concern”); Frewen v. Page, 131 N.E. 475, 476 (Mass. 1921) 
(mental distress damages for humiliation recoverable for breach of contract between 
innkeeper and guest because contract contained an implied obligation that “neither the 
innkeeper or the servant will abuse or insult the guest, or engage in any conduct or speech 
which may unreasonably subject him to physical discomfort or distress of mind or 
imperil his safety.”); Hill v. Sereneck, 355 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (mental 
distress damages recoverable for breach of a home construction contract where breach 
affected habitability); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, (Cal. Ct. App. 
1970) (mental anguish damages recoverable for breach of contract to have family rings 
made into an heirloom). Even state courts generally reluctant to award emotional 
damages have found exceptions in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Guerin v. New 
Hampshire Catholic Charities, Inc., 418 A.2d 224, 227 (N.H 1980) (mental distress 
damages claim viable for eviction from a nursing home). See also, Kewin v. Mass. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (finding insurance contracts for 
disability income protection did not involve protection of personal interests because 
contracts were commercial in nature). 
 144 Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611, 618 (N.C. 1979) (citing D. DOBBS, 
REMEDIES §12.4, 819). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Plaintiffs suffering emotional harm from sexual harassment, as in Franklin, or 
from feeling rejected, isolated, and discriminated against because of their HIV status, as 
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V. THE RECOVERY OF EMOTIONAL DAMAGES IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE 
OPTIMAL DETERRENCE 
We believe that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is not only in 
accord with precedent, but also ensures that plaintiffs have the proper 
incentive to sue. In passing section 1988 providing for attorneys fees in 
eight civil rights statutes, including Title VI and Title IX, “Congress was 
aware that ‘[the] effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes 
depends largely on the efforts of private citizens,’147 and that ‘a vast 
majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal 
counsel [and] are unable to present their cases to the courts.’”148 
Providing victims with the proper ability to sue is essential because 
victims need “‘private [attorneys] generals advancing the rights of the 
public at large, and not merely some narrow parochial interest.”149 Thus, 
when Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA,150 it 
provided that successful plaintiffs would be able to recover attorney’s 
fees.151 
Simply providing plaintiffs with injunctive relief does not provide 
plaintiffs with the proper incentive to sue. A plaintiff who sues has a 
probability, “p” 152 that he will prevail and a probability “1-p” that he 
will lose and not collect attorneys’ fees.  If a winning plaintiff does not 
receive any monetary reward, then the only monetary benefit a plaintiff 
receives are attorney’s fees. But in this case, the expected monetary 
outcome is less than the fees spent on the attorneys. That is: 
Expected monetary outcome = p (attorney’s fees) + (1-p) (0) 
     = p (attorney’s fees) 
     < attorney’s fees because p < 1. 
                                                                                                             
in Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F.Supp. 559, 573 (D.D.C. 1992), certainly had 
cognizable emotional harm. 
 147 H. R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976). 
 148 Long v. Bonnes, 455 U.S, 961, 967 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)) (citation omitted). 
 149 Long, 455 U.S at 967, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 122 CONG. REC. 35122 
(1976) (statement of Rep. Drinan)). 
 150 42 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (2007) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this title [29 USCS §§ 790 et seq.], the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee 
as part of the costs.”). 
 151 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2007) (“In any action or administrative proceeding 
commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including 
litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”) 
 152 A plaintiff never has a 100% probability it will prevail, regardless of the merits of 
the case. Thus, p < 1. 
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Simply put, if a plaintiff receives only injunctive relief, he will not 
have the proper incentive to sue. 
In mandating that successful plaintiffs recover attorney’s fees, 
Congress plainly demonstrated an intention for plaintiffs to have the 
proper incentive to sue.153 Thus, only providing for injunctive relief 
manifestly contradicts Congressional intent because victims will no 
longer be encouraged to enforce their rights and the rights of others 
similarly-situated. Accordingly, society will be harmed because many 
plaintiffs will not bring legal actions to obtain injunctive relief. The 
reduction in suits, including injunctive relief, would eviscerate the Act’s 
attempt to deter discrimination and ensure equal treatment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Franklin did not address the 
issue of the scope of compensatory damages and looked to Barnes to 
determine what is “appropriate.” A central purpose of the implied 
contract here is to protect the emotional well-being of persons with 
disabilities. A federal recipient’s failure to do so should permit the third 
party beneficiary to sue for damages caused by the breach. 
Concededly, there is the danger that permitting the recovery of 
emotional damages will undermine disability rights. This could occur if 
private entities that face severe penalties engage in overly defensive 
behavior, such as removing any access currently enjoyed. Private entities 
might also decide that the benefits of receiving federal aid do not 
outweigh the costs associated with facing suits from plaintiffs claiming 
to suffer from emotional damages. 
Although we recognize these possibilities, we think they are 
unlikely. A plaintiff will only be able to obtain damages if he can prove 
he actually suffered emotional harm. We suspect the cost of proving 
emotional damages is fairly high, yet the potential recovery is fairly low. 
Courts understand that emotional injuries are difficult to assess; 
consequently, courts may look to previous discrimination cases granting 
damages for emotional distress, try to relate damages to injury, or 
exercise discretionary control over the jury’s award.154 Moreover, there is 
                                                                                                             
 153 See Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (An award of 
attorney’s fees is a departure from general practice that the losing party is not required to 
reimburse the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees and is “designed as an incentive to 
plaintiffs to engage in litigation to vindicate civil rights.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(2006) (providing a fee-shifting provision granting courts the discretion to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in Title IX, Title VI, and six other 
statutes). 
 154 See, e.g., Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding $500 
award for emotional distress after plaintiff was denied housing because of his gender 
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no possibility for punitive damages. Thus, providing for emotional 
damages is unlikely to result in a slew of merit-less lawsuits brought by 
“ambulance chasing” attorneys. In short, any costs associated with the 
possibility of vexatious litigation that may result from the right to sue for 
emotional damages does not outweigh the costs associated with the loss 
of optimal deterrence that could have occurred if the right to sue for 
emotional damages was denied. 
 
                                                                                                             
where distress was ephemeral); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(upholding $75,000 to a victim of false arrest after psychiatrist testified plaintiff suffered 
from post-traumatic stress disorder); Wade v. Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 844 F.2d 
951 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding Title VII plaintiff’s award for $50,000 compensatory 
damages for emotional distress where evidence demonstrated plaintiff suffered from 
repeated humiliation at work and racially motivated harassment); Portee v. Hastava, 853 
F. Supp. 597, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (looking at twenty-one cases since 1988 in which 
some form of discrimination resulted in emotional distress where damages ranged from 
$500 to $75,000 to support the court’s determination that the jury’s award of $280,000 
was excessive); Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993) (awarding ADA 
plaintiff $1,000 for her feelings of isolation, segregation and stigmatization after not 
being assigned a roommate). 
